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Abstract. The paper concerns available steganographic techniques that can be 
used for creating covert channels for VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) 
streams. Apart from characterizing existing steganographic methods we provide 
new insights by presenting two new techniques. The first one is network stega-
nography solution which exploits free/unused protocols’ fields and is known for 
IP, UDP or TCP protocols but has never been applied to RTP (Real-Time 
Transport Protocol) and RTCP (Real-Time Control Protocol) which are charac-
teristic for VoIP. The second method, called LACK (Lost Audio Packets Stega-
nography), provides hybrid storage-timing covert channel by utilizing delayed 
audio packets. The results of the experiment, that was performed to estimate a 
total amount of data that can be covertly transferred during typical VoIP con-
versation phase, regardless of steganalysis, are also included in this paper. 
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1   Introduction 
VoIP is one of the most popular services in IP networks and it stormed into the 
telecom market and changed it entirely. As it is used worldwide more and more will-
ingly, the traffic volume that it generates is still increasing. That is why VoIP is suit-
able to enable hidden communication throughout IP networks. Applications of the 
VoIP covert channels differ as they can pose a threat to the network communication or 
may be used to improve the functioning of VoIP (e.g. security like in [12] or quality of 
service like in [13]). The first application of the covert channel is more dangerous as it 
may lead to the confidential information leakage. It is hard to assess what bandwidth 
of covert channel poses a serious threat – it depends on the security policy that is 
implemented in the network. For example, US Department of Defense specifies in 
[24] that any covert channel with bandwidth higher than 100 bps must be considered 
insecure for average security requirements. Moreover for high security requirements it 
should not exceed 1 bps. 
In this paper we present available covert channels that may be applied for VoIP 
during conversation phase. A detailed review of steganographic methods that may be 
applied during signalling phase of the call can be found in [14]. Here, we introduce 
two new steganographic methods that, to our best knowledge, were not described 
earlier. Next, for each of these methods we estimate potential bandwidth to evaluate 
experimentally how much information may be transferred in the typical IP telephony 
call. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we circumscribe the VoIP traffic 
and the communication flow. In Section 3, we describe available steganographic me-
thods that can be utilized to create covert channels in VoIP streams. Then in Section 4 
we present results of the experiment that was performed. Finally, Section 5 concludes 
our work. 
2  VoIP Communication Flow 
VoIP is a real-time service that enables voice conversations through IP networks. It is 
possible to offer IP telephony due to four main groups of protocols: 
a. Signalling protocols that allow to create, modify, and terminate connections be-
tween the calling parties – currently the most popular are SIP [18], H.323 [8], and 
H.248/Megaco [4], 
b. Transport protocols – the most important is RTP [19], which provides end-to-end 
network transport functions suitable for applications transmitting real-time audio. 
RTP is usually used in conjunction with UDP (or rarely TCP) for transport of digi-
tal voice stream, 
c. Speech codecs e.g. G.711, G.729, G.723.1 that allow to compress/decompress 
digitalized human voice and prepare it for transmitting in IP networks. 
d. Other supplementary protocols like RTCP [19], SDP, or RSVP etc. that complete 
VoIP functionality. For purposes of this paper we explain the role of RTCP proto-
col: RTCP is a control protocol for RTP and it is designed to monitor the Quality 
of Service parameters and to convey information about the participants in an on-
going session.  
 
Generally, IP telephony connection consists of two phases: a signalling phase and a 
conversation phase. In both phases certain types of traffic are exchanged between 
calling parties. In this paper we present a scenario with SIP as a signalling protocol 
and RTP (with RTCP as control protocol) for audio stream transport. That means that 
during the signalling phase of the call certain SIP messages are exchanged between 
SIP endpoints (called: SIP User Agents). SIP messages usually traverse through SIP 
network servers: proxies or redirects that allow end-users to locate and reach each 
other. After this phase, the conversation phase begins, where audio (RTP) streams 
flow bi-directly between a caller and a callee. VoIP traffic flow described above and 
distinguished phases of the call are presented in Fig. 1. For more clarity we omitted 
the SIP network server in this diagram. Also potential security mechanisms in traffic 
exchanges were ignored. 
 Fig. 1. VoIP call setup based on SIP/SDP/RTP/RTCP protocols (based on [9]) 
3   Covert Channels in VoIP Streams Overview and New Insights 
Besides characterizing IP telephony traffic flow Fig. 1 also illustrates steganographic 
model used in this paper for VoIP steganography evaluation. The proposed model is 
as follows. Two users A and B are performing VoIP conversation while simultaneous-
ly utilizing it to send steganograms by means of all possible steganographic methods 
that can be applied to IP telephony protocols. We assume that both users control their 
end-points (transmitting and receiving equipment) thus they are able to modify and 
inspect the packets that are generated and received. After modifications at calling 
endpoint, packets are transmitted through communication channel which may intro-
duce negative effects e.g. delays, packet losses or jitter. Moreover, while traveling 
through network packets can be inspected and modified by an active warden [5]. Ac-
tive wardens act like a semantic and syntax proxy between communication sides. They 
are able to modify and normalize exchanged traffic in such a way that it does not 
break, disrupt or limit any legal network communication or its functionality. Thus, 
active wardens can inspect all the packets sent and modify them slightly during the 
VoIP call. It must be emphasized however that they may not erase or alter data that 
can be potentially useful for VoIP non-steganographic (overt) users. This assumption 
forms important active wardens’ rule although sometimes elimination of the covert 
channel due to this rule may be difficult. 
To later, in section 4, practically evaluate covert channels that can be used for 
VoIP transmission we must first define three important measures that characterizes 
them and which must be taken into consideration during VoIP streams covert channels 
analysis. These measures are: 
• Bandwidth that may be characterized with RBR (Raw Bit Rate) that describes how 
many bits may be sent during one time unit [bps] with the use of all steganographic 
techniques applied to VoIP stream (with no overheads included) or PRBR (Packet 
Raw Bit Rate) that circumscribe how much information may be covertly sent in 
one packet [bits/packet], 
• Total amount of covert data [bits] transferred during the call that may be sent in 
one direction with the use of all applied covert channels methods for typical VoIP 
call. It means that, regardless of steganalysis, we want to know how much covert 
information can be sent during typical VoIP call, 
• Covert data flow distribution during the call – how much data has been transferred 
in a certain moment of the call. 
 
We will be referencing to abovementioned measures during the following sections 
while presenting available steganographic methods for VoIP communication and later 
during the experiment description and results characterization. 
In this section we will provide an overview of existing steganographic techniques 
used for creation of covert channels in VoIP streams and present new solutions. As 
described earlier during the conversation phase audio (RTP) streams are exchanged in 
both directions and additionally, RTCP messages may be sent. That is why the availa-
ble steganographic techniques for this phase of the call include: 
• IP/UDP/TCP/RTP protocols steganography in network and transport layer of 
TCP/IP stack, 
• RTCP protocol steganography in application layer of TCP/IP stack, 
• Audio watermarking (e.g. LSB, QIM, DSSS, FHSS, Echo hiding) in application 
layer of TCP/IP stack, 
• Codec SID frames steganography in application layer of TCP/IP stack, 
• Intentionally delayed audio packets steganography in application layer of TCP/IP 
stack, 
• Medium dependent steganographic techniques like HICCUPS [22] for VoWLAN 
(Voice over Wireless LAN) specific environment in data link layer of TCP/IP 
stack. 
 
Our contribution in the field of VoIP steganography includes the following: 
• Describing RTP/RTCP protocols’ fields that can be potentially utilized for hidden 
communication, 
• Proposing security mechanisms fields steganography for RTP/RTCP protocols, 
• Proposing intentionally delayed audio packets steganographic method called 
LACK (Lost Audio Packets Steganographic Method). 
 
3.1 IP/TCP/UDP Protocols Steganography   
TCP/UDP/IP protocols steganography utilizes the fact that only few fields of headers 
in the packet are changed during the communication process ([15], [1], [17]). Covert 
data is usually inserted into redundant fields (provided, but often unneeded) for 
abovementioned protocols and then transferred to the receiving side. In TCP/IP stack, 
there is a number of methods available, whereby covert channels can be established 
and data can be exchanged between communication parties secretly. An analysis of the 
headers of TCP/IP protocols e.g. IP, UDP, TCP results in fields that are either unused 
or optional [15], [25]. This reveals many possibilities where data may be hidden and 
transmitted. As described in [15] the IP header possesses fields that are available to be 
used as covert channels. Notice, that this steganographic method plays an important 
role for VoIP communication because protocols mentioned above are present in every 
packet (regardless, if it is a signalling message, audio packet, or control message). For 
this type of steganographic method as well as for other protocols in this paper (RTP 
and RTCP steganography) achieved steganographic bandwidth can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
where: 
PRBRNS (Packet Raw Bit Rate) denotes bandwidth of the covert channel created by 
IP/TCP/UDP steganography [bits/packet], 
SB0 is total amount of bits for IP/TCP/UDP protocols that can be covertly send in 
the fields of the first packet. This value differs from the value achieved for the fol-
lowing packets because in the first packet initial values of certain fields can be 
used (e.g. sequence number for TCP protocol), 
SBj denotes total amount of bits for IP/TCP/UDP protocols that can be covertly 
sent in the fields of the following packets, 
l is number of packets send besides first packet. 
 
3.2 RTP Protocols Steganography   
3.2.1 RTP Free/Unused Fields Steganography 
In conversation phase of the call when the voice stream is transmitted, besides proto-
cols presented in section 3.1 also the fields of RTP protocol may be used as a covert 
channel. Fig. 5 presents the RTP header. 
 
 
Fig. 5. RTP header with marked sections that are encrypted and authenticated 
 
RTP provides the following opportunities for covert communication: 
• Padding field may be needed by some encryption algorithms. If the padding bit (P) 
is set, the packet contains one or more additional padding octets at the end of 
header which are not a part of the payload. The number of the data that can be 
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added after the header is defined in the last octet of the padding as it contains a 
count of how many padding octets should be ignored, including itself, 
• Extension header (when X bit is set) – similar situation as with the padding me-
chanism, a variable-length header extension may be used, 
• Initial values of the Sequence Number and Timestamp fields – because both initial 
values of these fields must be random, the first RTP packet of the audio stream 
may be utilized for covert communication, 
• Least significant bits of the Timestamp field can be utilized in a similar way as 
proposed in [6]. 
 
It must be emphasized however that steganography based on free/unused/optional 
fields for RTP protocol (as well as for protocols mentioned in section 3.1) may be 
potentially eliminated or greatly limited by active wardens. Normalization of RTP 
headers’ fields values (e.g. applied to Timestamps) or small modifications applied may 
be enough to limit covert bandwidth. On the other hand it is worth noting that so far 
no documented active warden implementation exists. 
 
3.2.2 RTP Security Mechanisms Steganography 
There is also another way to create high-bandwidth covert channel for RTP protocol. 
In Fig. 5 one can see what parts of RTP packet is secured by using encryption (payl-
oad and optionally header extension if used) and authentication (authentication tag). 
For steganographic purposes we may utilize security mechanisms’ fields. The main 
idea is to use authentication tag to transfer data in a covert manner. In SRTP (Secure 
RTP) standard [2] it is recommended that this field should be 80 bits long but lower 
values are also acceptable (e.g. 32 bits). Similar steganographic method that utilizes 
security mechanism fields was proposed for e.g. IPv6 in [11]. By altering content of 
fields like authentication tag with steganographic data it is possible to create covert 
channel because data in these fields is almost random due to the cryptographic me-
chanism operations. That is why it is hard to detect whether they carry real security 
data or hidden information. Only receiving calling party, as he is in possession of pre-
shared key (auth_key) is able to determine that. For overt users wrong authentication 
data in packet will mean dropping it. But because receiving user is controlling its 
VoIP equipment, when authentication tag fields are utilized as covert channel, he is 
still able to extract steganograms in spite of invalid authentication result.  
Thus, most of steganalysis methods will fail to uncover this type of secret commu-
nication. The only solution is to strip off/erase such fields from the packets but this is 
a serious limitation for providing security services for overt users. Moreover it will be 
violation of the active warden rule (that no protocol’s semantic or syntax will be dis-
rupted). 
Because the number of RTP packets per one second is rather high (depends on the 
voice frame generation interval) exploiting this tag provides a covert channel that 
bandwidth can be expressed as follows: 
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RBRSRTP (Raw Bit Rate) denotes bandwidth of the covert channel created by RTP 
security mechanism steganography (in bits/s), 
SBAT is total amount of bits in authentication tag for SRTP protocol (typically 80 
or 32 bits), 
Ip describes voice packet generation interval, in miliseconds (typically from 10 to 
60 ms). 
 
For example, consider a scenario in which authentication tag is 32 bits long and 
audio packet is generated each 20 ms. Based on equation 2 we can calculate that  
RBRSRTP = 1.6 kbit/s which is considerably high result for bandwidths of covert chan-
nel presented in this paper. 
 
3.3 RTCP Protocol Steganography 
3.3.1 RCTP Free/Unused Fields Steganography 
To our best knowledge this is the first proposal to use RTCP protocol messages as a 
covert channel. RTCP exchange is based on the periodic transmission of control pack-
ets to all participants in the session. Generally it operates on two types of packets 
(reports) called: Receiver Report (RR) and Sender Report (SR). Certain parameters 
that are enclosed inside those reports may be used to estimate network status. Moreo-
ver all RTCP messages must be sent in compound packet that consists of at least two 
individual types of RTCP reports. Fig. 6 presents headers of SR and RR reports of the 
RTCP protocol.  
   
Fig. 6. RTCP Receiver Report (RR) and Sender Report (SR)  
 
For sessions with small number of the participants the interval between the RTCP 
messages is 5 seconds and moreover sending RTCP communication (with overhead) 
should not exceed 5% of the session’s available bandwidth. For creating covert chan-
nels report blocks in SR and RR reports (marked in Fig. 6) may be utilized. Values of 
the parameters transferred inside those reports (besides SSRC_1 which is the source 
ID) may be altered, so the amount of information that may be transferred in each 
packet is 160 bits. It is clear, that if we use this type of steganographic technique, we 
lose some (or all) of RTCP functionality (it is a cost to use this solution). Other 
free/unused fields in these reports may be also used in the similar way. For example 
NTP Timestamp may be utilized in a similar way as proposed in [6]. 
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Other RTCP packet types include: SDES, APP or BYE. They can also be used in 
the same way as SR and RR reports. So the total PRBR for this steganographic tech-
nique is as follows: 
 (3) 
where: 
PRBRRTCP (Packet Raw Bit Rate) denotes bandwidth of the covert channel created 
with RCTP Free/Unused Fields Steganography (in bits/packet), 
SCP denotes size of the compound RTCP packet (the number of RTCP packet types 
inside the compound one), 
NRB is number of report blocks inside each RTCP packet type, 
SRB is the number of bits that can be covertly send in one RTCP report block. 
 
It is also worth noting that RTCP messages are based on IP/UDP protocols, so ad-
ditionally, for one RTCP packet, both protocols can be used for covert transmission. 
To improve capacity of this covert channel one may send RTCP packets more fre-
quently then each 5 seconds (which is default value proposed in standard) although it 
will be easier to uncover. Steganalysis of this method is not so straightforward as in 
case of security mechanism fields steganography. Active warden can be used to elimi-
nate or greatly limit the fields in which hidden communication can take place although 
it will be serious limitation of RTCP functionality for overt users. 
 
3.3.2 RTCP Security Mechanisms Steganography 
Analogously as for RTP protocol the same steganographic method that uses SRTP 
security mechanism may be utilized for RTCP and the achieved RBRRTCP rate is as 
follows: 
 
 
(4) 
where: 
RBRSRTCP (Raw Bit Rate) denotes bandwidth of the covert channel created with 
SRTP security mechanism steganography  [in bps], 
SBAT is total amount of bits in authentication tag for SRTP protocol, 
T denotes duration of the call (in seconds), 
l is number of RTCP messages exchanged during the call of length T. 
 
3.4 Audio Watermarking 
The primary application of audio watermarking was to preserve copyrights and/or 
intellectual properties called DRM (Digital Right Management). However, this tech-
nique can be also used to create effective covert channel inside a digital content. Cur-
rently there is a number of audio watermarking algorithms available. The most popu-
lar methods that can be utilized in real-time communication for VoIP service, include: 
LSB (Least Significant Bit), QIM (Quantization Index Modulation), Echo Hiding, 
DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum), and FHSS (Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum) [3]. For these algorithms the bandwidth of available covert channels de-
pends mainly on the sampling rate and the type of audio material being encoded. 
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Moreover, if covert data rate is too high it may cause voice quality deterioration and 
increased  risk of detection. In Table 1 examples of digital watermarking data rates are 
presented under conditions that they do not excessively affect quality of the conversa-
tion and limit probability of disclosure. Based on those results one can clearly see that, 
besides LSB watermarking, other audio watermarking algorithms covert channels’ 
bandwidth range from few to tens bits per second. 
Table 1. Audio watermarking algorithms and their experimentally calculated RBRs  
Audio watermarking 
algorithm 
Covert bandwidth RBR 
(based on [21]) 
Covert bandwidth RBR 
(based on [1]) 
LSB 1 kbps / 1 kHz (of sampling rate) 4 kbps 
DSSS 4 bps 22.5 bps 
FHSS - 20.2 bps 
Echo Hiding 16 bps 22.3 bps 
 
Thus, we must consider that each audio watermarking algorithm affects perceived 
quality of the call. That means that there is a necessary tradeoff between the amount of 
data to be embedded and the degradation in users’ conversation. On the other hand by 
using audio watermarking techniques we gain an effective steganographic method: 
because of the audio stream flow the achieved bandwidth of the covert channel is 
constant. Thus, although the bit rate of audio watermarking algorithms is usually not 
very high, it still may play important role for VoIP streams covert channels. 
Steganalysis of audio watermarking methods (besides for LSB algorithm which is 
easy to eliminate) is rather difficult and must be adjusted to watermarking algorithm 
used. It must be emphasized however that if hidden data embedding rate is chosen 
reasonably then detecting of the audio watermarking is hard but possible and in most 
cases erasing steganogram means great deterioration of voice quality. 
 
3.5 Speech Codec Silence Insertion Description (SID) Frames Steganography 
Speech codecs may have built-in or implement mechanisms like Discontinuous 
Transmission (DTX)/VAD (Voice Activity Detection)/CNG (Comfort Noise Genera-
tion) for network resources (e.g. bandwidth) savings. Such mechanisms are able to 
determine if voice is present in the input signal. If it is present, voice would be coded 
with the speech codec in other case, only a special frame called Silence Insertion De-
scription (SID) is sent. If there is a silence, in stead of sending large voice packets that 
do not contain conversation data only small amount of bits are transmitted. Moreover, 
during silence periods, SID frames may not be transferred periodically, but only when 
the background noise level changes. The size of this frame depends on the speech 
codec used e.g. for G.729AB it is 10 bits per frame while for G.723.1 it is 24 bits per 
frame. Thus, when DTX/VAD/CNG is utilized, during the silence periods SID frames 
can be used to covertly transfer data by altering information of background noise with 
steganogram. In this case no new packets are generated and the covert bandwidth 
depends on the speech codec used. It is also possible to provide higher bandwidth of 
the covert channel by influencing rate at which SID frames are issued. In general, the 
more of these frames are sent the higher the bandwidth of the covert channel. It must 
be however noted that the covert bandwidth for this steganographic is rather low. 
What is important, for this steganographic method steganalysis is simple to perform. 
Active warden that is able to modify some of the bits in SID frames (e.g. least signifi-
cant) can eliminate or greatly reduce the bandwidth of this method.  
 
3.6 LACK: Intentionally Delayed Audio Packets Steganography 
To our best knowledge this is the first proposal of using intentionally delayed (and in 
consequence lost) packets payloads as a covert channel for VoIP service. Although 
there was an attempt how to use channel erasures at the sender side for covert com-
munication [20] but this solution characterizes low bandwidth especially if we use it 
for VoIP connection (where the packet loss value must be limited). It is natural for IP 
networks that some packets can be lost due to e.g. congestion. For IP telephony, we 
consider a packet lost when:  
• It does not reach the destination point, 
• It is delayed excessive amount of time (so it is no longer valid), and that is why it 
may not be used for current voice reconstruction in the receiver at the arrival time. 
 
Thus, for VoIP service when highly delayed packet reaches the receiver it is recog-
nized as lost and then discarded. We can use this feature to create new steganographic 
technique. We called this method LACK (Lost Audio Packets Steganographic Me-
thod). In general, the method is intended for a broad class of multimedia, real-time 
applications. The proposed method utilizes the fact that for usual multimedia commu-
nication protocols like RTP excessively delayed packets are not used for reconstruc-
tion of transmitted data at the receiver (the packets are considered useless and dis-
carded). The main idea of LACK is as follows: at the transmitter, some selected audio 
packets are intentionally delayed before transmitting. If the delay of such packets at 
the receiver is considered excessive, the packets are discarded by a receiver not aware 
of the steganographic procedure. The payload of the intentionally delayed packets is 
used to transmit secret information to receivers aware of the procedure. For unaware 
receivers the hidden data is “invisible”. 
Thus, if we are able to add enough delay to the certain packets at the transmitter 
side they will not be used for conversation reconstruction. Because we are using legi-
timate VoIP packets we must realize that in this way we may influence conversation 
quality. That is why we must consider the accepted level of packet loss for IP telepho-
ny and do not exceed it. This parameter is different for various speech codecs as re-
searched in [16] e.g. 1% for G.723.1, 2% for G.729A, 3% for G.711 (if no additional 
mechanism is used to cope with this problem) or even up to 5% if mechanisms like 
PLC (Packet Loss Concealment) is used. So the number of packets that can be utilized 
for proposed steganographic method is limited. If we exceed packet loss threshold for 
chosen codec then there will be significant decrease in voice quality. 
Let us consider RTP (audio) stream (S) that consists of n packets (an): 
                  
                S = (a1, a2, a3, …,an)  and  n = T / If (5) 
where: 
S denotes RTP (audio) stream, 
an is n-th packet in the audio stream S, 
n a number of packets in audio stream. 
For every packet (an) at the transmitter output total delay (dT) is equal to:  
 
 
(6) 
where: 
d1 is speech codec processing delay, 
d2 is codec algorithm delay, 
d3 is packetization delay.  
 
Now, from stream S we choose i-th packet ai with a probability (pi): 
                                                    pi < pLmax (7) 
where: 
pLmax ∈ {1%, 5%} where 1% packet loss ratio is for VoIP without PLC mechanism 
and 5% packet loss ratio is for VoIP with PLC mechanism.  
 
To be sure that the RTP packet will be recognized as lost at the receiver, as men-
tioned earlier, we have to delay it by certain value. For the proposed steganographic 
method two important parameters must be considered and set to the right value: 
amount of time by which the chosen packet is delayed (d4), to ensure that it will be 
considered as lost at the receiver side and the packet loss probability (pi) for this ste-
ganographic method, to ensure that in combination with pLmax probability will not 
degrade perceived quality of the conversation. To properly choose a delay value, we 
must consider capacity of the receiver’s de-jitter buffer. The de-jitter buffer is used to 
alleviate the jitter effect (variations in packets arrival time caused by queuing, conten-
tion and serialization in the network). Its value (usually between 30-70 ms) is impor-
tant for the end-to-end delay budget (which should not exceed 150 ms). That is why 
we must add d4 delay (de-jitter buffer delay) to the dT value for the chosen packet (ai). 
If we ensure that d4 value is equal or greater than de-jitter buffer delay at the receiver 
side the packet will be considered lost. So the total delay (dT) for ai packets with addi-
tional d4 delay looks as follows (8): 
 
 
(8) 
where d4 is de-jitter buffer delay.  
Now that we are certain that the chosen packet (ai) is considered lost at the receiv-
er, we can use this packet’s payload as a covert channel. 
As mentioned earlier, the second important measure for proposed steganographic 
method is a probability pi. To properly calculate its value we must consider the fol-
lowing simplified packet loss model: 
 (9) 
where: 
pT  denotes total packet loss probability in the IP network that offers VoIP service 
with the utilizing of delayed audio packets, 
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pN is a probability of packet loss in the IP network that offers VoIP service without 
the utilizing delayed audio packets (network packet loss probability), 
pi denotes a maximum probability of the packet loss for delayed audio packets. 
 
When we transform (9) to calculate pi we obtain: 
 
 
(10) 
From (10) one can see that probability pi must be adjusted to the network condi-
tions. Information about network packet loss probability may be gained e.g. from the 
RTCP reports during the transmission. So, based on earlier description, we gain a 
covert channel with PRBR (Packet Raw Bit Rate) that can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
(11) 
where r is the speech codec rate. 
And available bandwidth expressed in RBR (Raw Bit Rate) can be described with 
the following equation (12): 
 (12) 
For example, consider a scenario with G.711 speech codec where: speech codec 
rate: r = 64 kbit/s and pi = 0.5% and If = 20 ms.  For these exemplary values RBR is 
320 b/s and PRBR is 6.4 bits/packet. One can see that the available bandwidth of this 
covert channel is proportional to the speech codec frame rate, the higher the rate, the 
higher the bandwidth. So the total amount of information (IT) that can be covertly 
transmitted during the call of length d (in seconds) is: 
 (13) 
Proposed steganographic method has certain advantages. Most of all, although it is 
an application layer steganography technique, it is less complex than e.g. most audio 
steganography algorithms and the achieved bandwidth is comparable or even higher.  
Steganalysis of LACK is harder than in case of other steganographic methods that 
are presented in this paper. This is mainly because it is common for IP networks to 
introduce losses. If the amount of the lost packets used for LACK is kept reasonable 
then it may be difficult to uncover hidden communication. Potential steganalysis me-
thods include:  
• Statistical analysis of the lost packets for calls in certain network. This may be 
done by passive warden (or other network node) e.g. based on RTCP reports (Cu-
mulative number of packets lost field) or by observing RTP streams flow (packets’ 
sequence numbers). If for some of the observed calls the number of lost packets is 
higher than it can indicate potential usage of the LACK method, 
• Active warden which analyses all RTP streams in the network. Based on the SSRC 
identifier and fields: Sequence number and Timestamp from RTP header it can 
identify packets that are already too late to be used for voice reconstruction. Then 
active warden may erase their payloads fields or simply drop them. One problem 
with this steganalysis method is how greatly the packets’ identifying numbers must 
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differ from other packets in the stream to be discarded without eliminating really 
delayed packets that may be still used for conversation. The size of jitter buffer at 
the receiver is not fixed (and may be not constant) and its size is unknown to active 
warden. If active warden drops all delayed packets then it could remove packets 
that still will be usable for voice reconstruction. In effect, due to active warden op-
erations quality of conversation may deteriorate. 
 
Further in-depth steganalysis for LACK is surely required and is considered as fu-
ture work. 
 
3.7 Medium Dependent Steganography 
Medium dependent steganography typically uses layer 1 or layer 2 of ISO OSI RM. 
For VoIP e.g. in homogenous WLAN environment data link layer methods that de-
pend on available medium like HICCUPS [22] system can be utilized. Exemplary, the 
data rate for this system is 216 kbit/s (IEEE 802.11g 54 Mbit/s, changing of frame 
error rate from 1.5% into 2.5%, bandwidth usage 40%).  
It must be emphasized however that this steganographic method is difficult to im-
plement as it require modification to network cards. Moreover, steganalysis for 
HICCUPS is difficult too as it necessary to analyze frames in physical layer of OSI 
RM model. 
4 Experimental Evaluation of VoIP Streams Covert Channels 
Bandwidth 
Total achieved covert channel bandwidth (BT) for the whole VoIP transmission is a 
sum of each, particular bandwidth of each steganographic methods that are used dur-
ing voice transmission (each steganographic subchannel). It can be expressed as fol-
lows: 
 
 
(14) 
where: 
BT denotes a total bandwidth for the whole VoIP voice transmission (may be ex-
pressed in RBR or PRBR), 
Bj describes a bandwidth of the covert channel created by each steganographic me-
thod used during VoIP call (may be expressed in RBR or PRBR), 
k is a number of steganographic techniques used for VoIP call. 
 
The value of BT is not constant and depends on the following factors: 
• The number of steganographic techniques applied to the VoIP call, 
• The choice of the speech codec used. Three important aspects must be considered 
here: compression rate (e.g. G.711 achieves 64 kbit/s while G729AB only 8 
kbit/s), size of the voice frame that is inserted into each packet and voice packet 
generation interval. Compression rate influences the available bandwidth of the 
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steganographic methods that relay on it. The size of the voice frame (typically 
from 10 to 30 ms) and voice packet generation interval influence the number of 
packets in audio stream.  
• If the mechanisms like VAD/CNG/DTX are used. Some of the speech codecs have 
those mechanisms built-in, for some of them they must be additionally imple-
mented. These solutions influence the number of packets that are generated during 
VoIP call. The lower number of packets are transmitted the lower total covert 
channel bandwidth BT value. 
• The probability value of the packet loss in IP network. Firstly, if this value is high 
we lose certain number of packets that are sent into the network, so the information 
covertly transferred within them is also lost. Secondly, while using delayed audio 
packets steganography we must adjust the probability of the intentionally lost 
packets to the level that exists inside the network to be sure that the perceived 
quality of the call is not degenerated. 
• Less important steganographic methods specific conditions like: how often are 
RTCP reports are sent to the receiving party or if security mechanisms for commu-
nication are used. 
 
To evaluate measures presented at the beginning of Section 3 the following test 
scenario, as depicted in Fig. 7, has been setup. Two SIP User Agents were used to 
make a call – the signalling messages were exchanged with SIP proxy and the audio 
streams flowed directly between endpoints. Moreover RTCP protocol was used to 
convey information about network performance. Audio was coded with ITU-T G.711 
A-law PCM codec (20 ms of voice per packet, 160 bytes of payload). The ACD (Av-
erage Call Duration) for this experiment was chosen based on duration of the call for 
Skype service [21] and for other VoIP providers. In [7] results obtained that ACD for 
Skype is about 13 minutes, while VoIP providers typically uses a value between 7 and 
11 minutes. That is why we chose ACD for the experiment at 9 minutes. There were 
30 calls performed and all diagrams show average results. 
 
Fig. 7. VoIP steganography experimental test setup 
 
The calls were initiated by SIP UA A and the incoming traffic was sniffed at SIP 
UA B. This way we were able to measure covert channel behavior for only one direc-
tion traffic flow. Based on the analysis of the available steganographic methods in 
section 3 the following steganographic techniques were used during the test (and the 
amount of data that were covertly transferred) as presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Steganographic methods used for experiment and their PRBR 
Steganographic method Chosen PRBR 
  IP/UDP protocol steg. 32 bits/packet 
RTP protocol steg. 16 bits/packet 
RTCP steg. 192 bits/packet 
LACK 1280 bits/packet  (used 0.1% of all RTP packets) 
QIM (audio watermarking) 0.6 bits/packet 
 
We chose these steganographic methods for the experiment because they are easy 
to implement and/or they are our contribution. Besides they are the most natural 
choice for VoIP communication (based on the analysis’ results from section 3) and, 
additionally, they represent different layers steganography. It is also important to note 
that assumed PRBR values for these methods were chosen to be reasonable in stegana-
lysis context. We are interested however only in estimating a total amount of data that 
can be covertly transferred during the typical conversation phase of the VoIP call, and 
not how hard is to perform steganalysis. We want to see if the threat posed by stega-
nography applied to VoIP is serious or not. 
Achieved results of the experiment are presented below. First in Table 3 traffic 
flow characteristics, that were captured during performed VoIP calls are presented. 
Table 3. Types of traffic distribution average results 
Type of traffic Percent [%] 
  SIP messages 0.016 
RTP packets 99.899 
RTCP reports 0.085 
 
From Table 3 can be concluded that the steganographic methods that that utilizes 
RTP packets have the most impact on VoIP steganography as they cover 99.9% of the 
whole VoIP traffic. Next in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 averaged results of the covert data flow 
distribution (RBR and PRBR respectively) during the average call are presented. 
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Fig. 8. Covert transmission data flow distribution for the experimental setup 
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Fig. 9. PRBR during the average call 
 
As one can see VoIP covert channels bandwidth expressed in RBR and PRBR 
changes in rather constant range during the call (between 2450 and 2600 bits/s for 
RBR and between 48 and 53 bits/packet for PRBR). The periodic peaks for curves 
presented in both figures are caused by steganographic bandwidth provided by LACK 
method. In every certain period of time packets are selected to be intentionally de-
layed and their payloads carry steganograms. For instants when these packets reach 
receiver the steganographic bandwidth increases. For this experiment the following 
average values were obtained and were presented in Table 4: 
Table 4. Experimental results for typical call (for one direction flow only) 
Measure Value Standard Deviation 
Average total 
amount of covert 
data  
1364170 
[bits] 4018.711 
Average RBR 2487,80 [bits/s] 4.025 
Average PRBR 50,04 [bits/packet] 2.258 
 
From the Table 4 we see that during the typical call one can transfer more than 1.3 
Mbits (170 KB) of data in one direction with RBR value at about 2.5 kbit/s (50 
bits/packet for PRBR).  
Table 5. Types of traffic and theirs covert bandwidth fraction 
Type of traffic Bandwidth fraction [%] 
Bandwidth fraction [%] per  
steganographic method 
RTP packets 99.646 
IP/UDP 64.11 
RTP 32.055 
Delayed  
audio packets 2.633 
Audio  
watermarking 1.202 
RTCP reports 0.354 - 
As results from Table 5 show vast part of covert channels’ bandwidth for VoIP is 
provided by network steganography (for protocols IP/UDP it is about 64% and for 
RTP 32%). Next steganographic method is delayed audio packets steganography 
(about 2.6%) and audio watermarking (about 1.2%). RTCP steganography provides 
only minor bandwidth if we compare it with other methods. 
5   Conclusions 
In this paper we have introduced two new steganographic methods: one of them is 
RTP and RTCP protocols steganography and the second is intentionally delayed audio 
packets steganography (LACK). We also briefly described other existing stegano-
graphic methods for VoIP streams. Next, for chosen steganographic method the expe-
riment was performed. Obtained results showed that during typical VoIP call we are 
able to send covertly more than 1.3 Mbits of data in one direction.  
Moreover, the next conclusion is that the most important steganographic method in 
VoIP communication experiment is IP/UDP/RTP protocols steganography, while it 
provides over 96% of achieved covert bandwidth value. Other methods that contribute 
significantly are delayed audio packets steganography (about 2.6%) and audio water-
marking techniques (about 1.2%).  
Based on the achieved results we can conclude that total covert bandwidth for typ-
ical VoIP call is high and it is worth noting that not all steganographic methods were 
chosen to the experiment. Steganalysis may limit achieved bandwidth of the covert 
channels to some extent. But two things must be emphasized. Firstly, currently there is 
no documented active warden implementation thus there are no real counter measure-
ments applied in IP networks so all the steganographic methods can be used for this 
moment. Secondly, analyzing each VoIP packet in active warden for every type of 
steganography described here can potentially lead to loss in quality due to additional 
delays – this would require further study in future. So, whether we treat VoIP covert 
channels as a potential threat to network security or as a mean to improve VoIP func-
tionality we must accept the fact that the number of information that we can covertly 
transfer is significant. 
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